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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103 (2)(a) and § 10-3-1106(6)(a). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are of central importance to the appeal: Utah Code Ann. 
§67-21-3(l)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5; and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. Their text is included verbatim in Addendum A attached 
hereto. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
First Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in finding that, during his employment 
with Midvale City, Petitioner mishandled evidence and/or property that came into his 
possession, in violation of Midvale City Police Department Policy? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing the factual findings made by an 
administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
Second Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in finding that Petitioner committed an 
act of theft and misappropriation of property when he copied photographs that another 
officer had downloaded to Petitioner's assigned computer onto Petitioner's personally 
owned CD, despite the fact that Midvale City failed to state the elements of theft and 
misappropriation to the Appeals Board and failed to present any evidence to support the 
allegation? 
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Standard of Review: Mixed question of fact and law. "When reviewing the 
factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally 
reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Questions of law are reviewed 
for correctness. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
Third Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in finding that Petitioner intentionally 
viewed pornographic materials on his City-owned computer in violation of Midvale City 
and Police Department Policy? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing the factual findings made by an 
administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
Fourth Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in including as an element of 
termination Petitioner's delivery of a CD containing lewd photographs of Midvale City 
employees to the Utah Attorney General's Office, in light of the Utah Protection of 
Public Employees Act? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
Fifth Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in including as an element of termination 
Petitioner's reporting of a public safety hazard directly to the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco 
and Firearms, in light of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act? 
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Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
Sixth Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in concluding that termination of 
Petitioner was the proportionate and appropriate discipline for Petitioner's alleged 
violations of policies? 
Standard of Review: Mixed question of fact and law. "When reviewing the 
factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally 
reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 30, 2008, Petitioner Jack Guenon (hereinafter "Guenon") was placed on 
paid administrative leave pending an investigation of Guenon5s conduct as a police 
officer with Midvale City (hereinafter the "City"). R. 219. On or about October 31, 
2008, Guenon's employment with the City was terminated. R. 222. In its Disciplinary 
Order, the City set forth five specific bases for the termination. Id. 
Guenon appealed his termination to the Midvale City Employee Appeals Board 
("Appeals Board"), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. R. 1-134. A hearing 
before the Appeals Board was held on November 20, 2008 and December 1, 2008. Id. 
On December 10, 2008, the Appeals Board upheld the termination, finding that the City 
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had proven all five of its stated reasons for the termination. See Addendum B. Guenon 
timely filed this appeal on December 22, 2008. See Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Allegations 
At the time it terminated Guenon's employment, the City furnished Guenon with a 
Disciplinary Order detailing the City's findings and conclusions. R. 222-223. The Order 
sets forth five specific grounds for Guenon's termination, as follows: 
[Guenon] handled evidence, namely, driver's licenses, credit cards, 
state identification cards, immigration identification cards, and 
Mexico Identification cards. These items were found in [Guenon's] 
police vehicle in violation of Police Department General order 13-
l.a). 
[Guenon] found and otherwise possessed private personal property, 
namely, a DVD/CD. [Guenon] admitted making copies of it and 
distributed these copies to other individuals. This is an act of theft 
and misappropriation of property of another. This act is in violation 
of Police Department General Order 6.01.4 and City Policy 
Standards of Conduct, page 61. 
[Guenon] viewed pornographic materials on [Guenon's] City-owned 
computer between the months of November 2007 and August 2008 
for non-departmental purposes in violation of Police Department 
General Order No. 17-3 and City Policy Computer Systems Internet 
and Electronic Communication Policy, pages 49 and 50. 
[Guenon] committed at least two known separate acts of 
insubordination by failing to follow the chain of command by doing 
the following: 
1
 Respondents failed to include two key items - the Appeals Board's findings and 
conclusions and Guenon's Petition for Review - in their preparation of the record. 
Guenon attaches them to his brief as Addenda B and C, respectively. 
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Failure to follow chain of command, namely delivery of a 
DVD/CD to the attorney general's office and making 
complaints against fellow officers. (Department Policy No. 
106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61.) 
Reporting of alleged ATF violations to ATF in lieu of 
reporting the violations to City personnel. (Department 
Policy No. 106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 
61) 
R. 222. 
On December 10, 2008, the Appeals Board upheld The City's termination of 
Guenon. In its findings and conclusions, the Appeals Boards found that The City had 
proven each of its five bases for termination by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
Addendum B. 
Identification Cards 
Six current and former officers of the Midvale Police Department testified about 
the City's evidence policy. R. 76: pg. 233 (2-25); R. 77: pg. 234 (1-8); R. 79: pg. 242 
(11-14); R. 84: pg 262 (6-12); R. 90: pg. 287 (18-25)-pg. 288 (1-9); R. 91: pg. 292 (1-8); 
R 93: pg. 301 (2-9). The Department policy technically requires officers to book 
evidence into the evidence room at the end of their working shift. However, officers 
often take identification cards from suspects but do not formally charge those suspects 
with crimes directly relating to the identification cards. Id. In those situations, the 
officers do not book the identification cards into evidence. Id. Rather, the officers' 
common practice is to shred the cards, throw them in the garbage, leave them lying 
around the police station, or store them in their police vehicles. Id. With the exception of 
Guenon, The City has never disciplined an officer for storing identification cards in his 
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vehicle or for otherwise failing to book them into evidence. R. 56: pg. 152 (1-4); R. 77: 
pg. 234 (1-8); R. 79: pg. 242 (11-14); R. 84: pg 262 (6-12); R. 90: pg. 287 (18-25)-pg. 
288 (1-9); R. 91: pg. 292 (1-8); R 93: pg. 301 (2-9). 
There is no evidence to suggest all of the identification cards found in Guenon's 
vehicle were cards he had personally taken from suspects but failed to place into 
evidence. For the last several months of Guenon's employment, every officer in the 
Department had access to his police vehicle. R. 93: pg. 300 (1-25). There is a pegboard 
in the Department containing spare keys for each police vehicle. R. 56: pg. 152 (24-25)-
pg. 153 (1). In addition, in the fall of 2007, the City revoked Guenon's ability to drive 
his police vehicle home when off-duty. R. 93: pg. 300 (1-6). Thus, while off-duty, 
Guenon's vehicle was stored at the police station and was available to, and driven by, 
other on-duty officers when the need arose. R. 93: pg. 300 (11-15). 
Theft 
Upon being transferred into the Detectives' Division, Guenon was assigned a 
computer workstation. R. 57: pg. 155 (18-21). The workstation had previously been 
assigned to a Sgt. Egan. Id. When Sgt. Egan vacated the workstation, he left behind a 
CD containing certain photographs. R. 57: pg. 156-159. Sgt. Egan had also downloaded 
the photographs onto the computer's hard drive. Id. When Guenon was assigned to the 
workstation, he found the CD and also discovered the photographs on the computer hard 
drive. Id. Guenon downloaded the photographs from the hard drive to a blank CD that 
Guenon owned. Id. Guenon left Sgt. Egan's CD in the desk drawer. Id. At no time did 
Guenon take possession of or misappropriate Sgt. Egan's CD. Id. Guenon did not 
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distribute the CD he had copied to any third party except for the Attorney General. R. 
59: pg. 165(2-15). 
At the Appeals Board hearing, The City failed to mention the elements of theft and 
misappropriation of property to the Appeals Board. Nor did the City present any 
evidence to rebut Guenon's testimony. 
Pornography 
City policy forbids police officers from intentionally viewing pornography on 
City-owned computers. R. 277-278. The laptop computer in question was in Guenon's 
possession for approximately nine months. When a computer visits a web site, every 
photograph on that site is imprinted onto the computer's hard drive. R. 81: pg. 253 (2-
15). Only three pornographic GIF files and a few vulgar cartoon images were found on 
the computer's hard drive for that entire time frame. R. 27: pg. 107-108. 
The few pornographic images found on Guenon's computer were sent to him 
unsolicited by third parties as Instant Messenger emoticons and/or via email. R. 62: pg. 
174 (24-25), pg. 175-176; R. 83: pg. 258 (1-24). Guenon had no control over what was 
being sent to his computer, but if he received images he deemed to be vulgar or offensive, 
he immediately closed them. Id. Sgt. Hodgkinson, the Police Department's computer 
technology manager, could not determine whether the few pornographic images found on 
Guenon's computer had been downloaded by Guenon and conceded they could have been 
sent by third parties to Guenon. R. 29: pg. 115-116(1-13). Sgt. Hodgkinson could not 
determine whether Guenon had solicited any of the images. Id. 
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The City sent Guenon's laptop to a forensic specialist to determine the extent of 
pornography viewed on Guenon's computer. R. 13: pg. 49 (14-25)-pg. 50 (1-4). The 
forensic examiner stated that when a person is actively seeking out and viewing 
pornography on a computer, vast amounts of images will show up imbedded on the 
computer's hard drive. R. 176. After a review of Guenon's laptop, the forensic examiner 
concluded that Guenon was not actively seeking pornography on the laptop. Id. 
Insubordination 
Some of the photographs Sgt. Egan downloaded onto his workstation computer 
depicted minor children in the presence of a female officer wearing a sheer negligee that 
revealed the officer's breast and nipples. R. 58: pg. 160 (25)-pg. 161 (1-7). At the time 
Guenon furnished his CD containing the photographs to the Attorney General, Guenon 
reasonably believed that the photographs depicted acts of lewdness with a child, a class A 
misdemeanor as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. R. 58: pg. 161 (11-18). 
In late 2007, the City purchased 50 pounds of explosives which it began storing in 
two different rooms located in the police station. R. 22: pg. 88 (10-14). The manner in 
which the explosives were being stored was a public safety hazard and violated 
regulations of the ATF. R. 185-186. The City knew of the ATF violations but failed to 
act because it lacked money to purchase an approved magazine. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R. 
183-186. Guenon first reported this violation to his direct supervisor and then directly to 
the ATF. R. 74: pg. 222 (18-25)-pg. 223 (1-7); R. 63: pg. 180 (5-8). The ATF 
investigated the charge, found that the way the explosives were being stored was a public 
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safety hazard, and ordered the City to immediately move the explosives to an approved 
magazine. R. 185-187. 
The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act prevents employers from taking 
adverse action against employees who report violations of law to the authorities. 
Moreover, the relevant City policies do not define the term "insubordination" and do not 
proscribe Guenon's conduct. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Identification Cards 
The City has a written policy requiring officers to book evidence into the evidence 
room at the end of their working shifts. However, the common practice among City 
officers was to not book identification cards into evidence when identification-related 
offenses were not being charged. Officers routinely left identification cards lying around 
the station or in their cars, as corroborated by the testimony of six different officers and 
the photographs of discarded identification cards. Many officers simply shredded the 
cards or threw them in the garbage. There is no practical difference in shredding a card 
or keeping it in one's vehicle. Furthermore, with the exception of Guenon, the City has 
never disciplined an officer for failing to book evidence. The City cannot single out one 
employee for discipline while turning a blind eye to other employees engaging in the 
same conduct. 
Theft 
When Guenon was assigned to a City computer, he discovered that the officer 
previously assigned to the computer, a Sgt. Egan, had uploaded questionable photographs 
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onto the hard drive. Sgt. Egan had also copied the photograiphs onto a disk which he left 
in a desk drawer next to the computer. Guenon downloaded the photographs from the 
computer hard drive onto a disk he owned. Guenon never took possession of Sergeant 
Egan's CD. Nor did Guenon distribute the CD he had copied to any third party except 
for the Attorney General. 
Guenon could not have committed theft because he never took possession of 
another's property. Guenon did not deprive Sgt. Egan of his property. At the Appeals 
Board hearing, the City presented no evidence that Guenon had committed theft. The 
City did not even mention the elements of theft and misappropriation to the Appeals 
Board. Thus, the Appeals Board could not possibly have assessed the sufficiency of the 
evidence on those charges. 
Pornography 
The City failed to show substantial evidence that Guenon intentionally viewed 
pornography on his City-owned computer. Even though Guenon had been assigned the 
computer for several months, the City only found a handful of images. Those images had 
been sent to Guenon by third parties via email or the Instant Messenger program. When 
this occurred, Guenon immediately tried to delete them. An independent forensic 
examiner hired by the City concluded that Guenon was not actively searching for 
pornography. The City's witness, Sgt. Hodgkinson, admitted the few images found on 
Guenon's computer could have been sent to Guenon unsolicited via e-mail. The City 
policy only prohibits the intentional viewing of pornography. Guenon cannot be 
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disciplined for receiving unsolicited pornographic images, as Guenon has no control over 
the content of those messages. 
Insubordination 
Guenon's conduct of reporting a suspected crime to the Attorney General and a 
known public safety hazard to the ATF was protected under the Utah Protection of Public 
Employees Act. Furthermore, there is no City policy specifically requiring officers to 
report crimes and safety hazards to superiors prior to reporting them to outside 
governmental agencies. Guenon9 s conduct does not fall within the parameters of the City 
policy on insubordination, which was the basis for Guenon's termination. 
Proportionality 
The City's disciplinary action - termination - was excessive and not proportionate 
to Guenon's actions. Guenon followed a common practice within the Department. 
Guenon did not intentionally view or solicit pornography. There is no evidence that 
Guenon stole or misappropriated property, and Guenon's reporting to the Attorney 
General and the ATF were protected under Utah law. Termination was also excessive in 
light of Guenon's exemplary record and commendations. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 has been interpreted by this Court as conferring upon 
"civil service employeefs]... a vested right to continued employment absent a legal cause 
for termination." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Com 'n, 949 P.2d 746, 753 (Utah 
App. 1997). The burden of proof was on The City to show it had sufficient cause to 
terminate Guenon's employment as a police officer. The City failed to meet its burden, 
and the Appeals Board's upholding of the termination was therefore improper. 
The Appeals Board made several factual findings pertaining to Guenon. "When 
reviewing the factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will 
generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake 
v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). "Substantial evidence" has 
been defined as evidence adequate enough to convince a reasonable mind to support the 
conclusion. Allen v. Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 
UT App 186,118, 112 P.3d 1238. 
Guenon also questions whether the Appeals Board correctly applied the law. 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness and "appellate review gives no deference 
to the trial judge's or agency's determination..." Id; See also State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). Mixed fact/law questions may require a more flexible standard 
allowing the appellate court to review an issue "with varying degrees of strictness"; 
therefore the standard may fall anywhere between a review for "correctness" and a 
"substantial evidence" standard. Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. 
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The Appeals Board should have made two inquiries when reviewing Guenon's 
appeal: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2) 
do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 
1361 (Utah 1986). The Appeals Board concluded that termination was the proper 
measure of discipline. This Court must determine "whether discipline is appropriate and 
second whether the particular discipline meted out is proportionate to the offense." Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com% 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah App. 
1995). An exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the 
balance against termination. Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 978 (Utah App. 
2005). 
EL THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUENON 
MISHANDLED EVIDENCE WHEN GUENON WAS FOLLOWING THE 
COMMON PRACTICE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT, 
After Guenon was placed on administrative leave, Captain Shreeve performed an 
inventory of Guenon's police vehicle. R. 19: pg. 74 (23-25); pg. 75 (1-5). Captain 
Shreeve testified that he found 44 various identification cards. Id. The relevant Midvale 
Police Department Policy states as follows: 
Property shall be placed in evidence before the end of an officer's 
shift. Evidence and property should not be stored in an officer's car, 
desk, locker, or office. 
R. 265. In terminating Guenon, the City alleged that Guenon violated this policy. R. 
222. At the Appeals Board hearing, Police Chief Mason reiterated that one of the reasons 
Guenon was terminated was for mishandling evidence. R. 5: pg. 18 (6-14). 
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Guenon testified that his understanding of the evidence policy was that an 
identification card should only be booked into evidence when the suspect from whom it 
was taken is charged with an offense directly relating to that card. R. 55: pg. 146 (11-
25); pg. 147 (1-4). Of the 44 identification cards found in Guenon's vehicle, none was 
connected to a report charging a suspect with an identification-related offense. R. 55: pg. 
147 (10-16). Guenon also testified that he had seen other officers shred identification 
cards, throw them away, and leave them in cars or around the office. R. 56: pg. 151 (20-
24). Guenon testified that, to his knowledge, no other officer had ever been disciplined 
for mishandling identification cards. R. 56: pg. 152 (1-4). 
At least six current and former officers of the Midvale Police Department also 
testified about their understanding of the evidence policy. Each officer stated that, 
despite the technical requirement of the policy, it was common practice within the 
department not to book identification cards into evidence when no identification-related 
offense had been charged. Sgt. Greg Olsen testified that he did not believe there was a 
policy on how to handle identification cards taken from suspects where no identification-
related offenses were being charged. R. 75: pg. 228 (5-11). He testified that "it was a 
gray area" within the department and that he had seen identification cards in other 
officer's vehicles, discarded in the patrol room, and thrown in a garbage can. R. 75: pg. 
228 (12-25), pg. 229 (1-8). Sgt. Olsen also stated that officers do not book identification 
cards into evidence when no identification-related crime is being charged because the 
cards will never be used in court and it wastes space in the evidence room. R. 76: pg. 233 
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(2-25); R. 77: pg. 234 (1-8). It was common practice at Midvale for the officer to either 
shred the cards or throw them away. R. 77: pg. 234 (3-8). 
The other former and current Midvale officers all agreed with Sgt. Olsen's 
testimony regarding the practice of handling identification cards in the department. See 
R. 79: pg. 242 (11-14); R. 84: pg 262 (6-12); R. 90: pg. 287 (18-25), pg. 288 (1-9); R. 91: 
pg. 292 (1-8); R 93: pg. 301 (2-9). Officer Ken Davis testified that it was the common 
practice for officers to shred identification cards, throw them in the garbage, leave them 
lying around the police station, or store them in their police vehicles, rather than book 
them into evidence. R. 84: pg. 264 (1-14). Officer Davis took several photographs, 
which were admitted into evidence, that showed discarded identification cards and 
license plates lying around the police station. R. 162-171. 
Former Midvale Officer Josh Woffinden (referred to as Wilkington in the Record) 
testified that he often saw identification cards strewn around the patrol room and that that 
practice had been ongoing for the last couple of years. R. 90: pg. 288 (7-12). Sgt. Ken 
Jarvis testified that it was common to find identification cards lying around the report 
writing room and in patrol cars. R. 93: pg. 301 (10-17); R. 95: pg. 307 (7-19). Sgt. Jarvis 
explained that he had never reported or disciplined any officer for that practice because it 
seemed to be the standard practice at Midvale. Id. Many of the officers also testified that 
they were unaware of the City ever disciplining an officer, with the exception of Guenon, 
for violating the technical requirements of the evidence policy. R. 75: pg. 229 (9-14); R. 
85: pg. 268 (6-10); R. 90: pg. 289 (2-5); R. 93: pg. 301 (21-25). 
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The City also failed to show that the 44 cards found in Guenon's vehicle were 
cards he had personally taken from suspects. For the last several months of Guenon's 
employment, every officer in the Department had access to his police vehicle. R. 93: pg. 
300 (1-25). There is a pegboard in the Department containing spare keys for each police 
vehicle. R. 56: pg. 152 (24-25)-pg. 153 (1). In the fall of 2007, the City revoked 
Guenon's ability to drive his police vehicle home when off-duty. R. 93: pg. 300 (1-6). 
Thus, while off-duty, Guenon's vehicle was stored at the police station and was driven 
by, and available to, other on-duty officers when the need arose. R. 93: pg. 300 (11-15). 
The undisputed evidence presented to the Appeals Board was that the common 
practice among City officers was not to book identification cards into evidence when 
identification-related offenses were not being charged. Officers routinely dealt with 
those cards in a haphazard way, sometimes shredding them, throwing them away, or 
leaving them in their vehicles or lying around the station. Those officers were never 
disciplined for this behavior. Guenon merely followed the common practice of handling 
evidence which had developed within the Department. The City cannot single out 
Guenon for discipline after having turned a blind eye to other employees engaging in the 
same conduct. 
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IIL THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUENON 
COMMITTED AN ACT OF THEFT AND MISAPPROPRIATION OF 
PROPERTY WHEN HE COPIED PHOTOGRAPHS OF ANOTHER 
OFFICER WHICH HAD BEEN DOWNLOADED TO A CITY OWNED 
COMPUTER ASSIGNED TO GUENON ONTO GUENON'S 
PERSONALLY OWNED CD, 
The second finding supporting Guenon's termination was that Guenon: 
found and otherwise possessed private personal property, namely, a 
DVD/CD. [Guenon] admitted making copies of it and distributed 
these copies to other individuals. This is an act of theft and 
misappropriation of property of another. This act is in violation of 
Police Department General Order 6.01.4 and City Policy Standards 
of Conduct, page 61. 
R. 222. The Appeals Board could not have found this by substantial evidence. First, the 
City did not present the Appeals Board with the elements of the alleged crimes. Second, 
the City did not present any evidence of theft or misappropriation. Third, the Appeals 
Board itself acknowledges that it was unsure whether Guenon's conduct rose to the level 
oftheft. 
The City failed to state the elements of theft and/or misappropriation of property 
to the Appeals Board. Midvale City Policy states that "[e]ach officer must know and 
abide by the law" and continues with "Critical Offenses...Theft of any kind." R. 274. 
The City Policy does not provide a definition of theft or misappropriation of property. 
Therefore, one is left to assume that the definitions are those found in the Utah Code. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 states: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 states in relevant part: "A person commits wrongful 
appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another, 
without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily 
17 
The Appeals Board could not possibly assess the sufficiency of the evidence against 
Guenon for theft and misappropriation of property when the elements of those offenses 
were not provided by the City to the Appeals Board. 
In addition, the City failed to show substantial evidence that Guenon did in fact 
commit an act of theft or misappropriation of property. Guenon was assigned a particular 
City computer and workstation to perform his work. R. 57: pg. 155 (18-21). The 
computer and workstation had formerly been assigned to Sgt. Egan. Id. When Sgt. Egan 
left the workstation, he left a CD containing certain photographs in a desk drawer. R. 57: 
pg. 156-159. Sgt. Egan had also downloaded those photographs onto the workstation 
computer but did not delete them from the hard drive. Id. While assigned to that 
workstation, Guenon found the photographs on the computer hard drive. Id. Guenon 
downloaded them onto a blank CD he owned. Id. At no time did Guenon take 
possession of or misappropriate Sergeant Egan's CD. Id. 
Under the criminal statutes for theft and misappropriation, a key element is the 
deprivation of property from its lawful owner. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; § 76-6-
404.5. Guenon could not "steal" the photographs, as they had been embedded in the hard 
drive of his assigned computer and clearly abandoned by Sgt. Egan. Guenon did not 
deprive Sgt. Egan of his property. Furthermore, the City was unclear who the 
photographs belonged to once Sgt. Egan left the workstation. When asked whether the 
photographs had become City property, Chief Mason stated, "I, I couldn't tell you. I 
appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal 
custodian of possession of the property." 
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think you're trying to lead me down a path that I just don't really know where, where it's 
leading." R. 13: pg. 49 (7-13). 
Based upon the scant evidence produced at the hearing, the Appeals Board could 
not have rationally concluded that Guenon had stolen property. Indeed, in its findings 
and conclusions, the Appeals Board never specifically finds that he did. Rather, the 
Appeals Board only states that the "taking, copying and distributing the photographs to 
others may be an act of theft and misappropriation of property... ." See Addendum B. It 
goes on to say that Guenon did not "have the right to copy files from the city's computer 
and possess them," without providing any City policy or other legal basis for such a 
statement. Id. The Appeals Board also concluded that Guenon "made copies of the 
photographs and distributed these copies to other individuals" without any factual basis 
whatsoever. The City provided no evidence of this. Guenon testified that the only third 
party he turned the photographs over to was the Attorney General. R. 59: pg. 165 (2-15). 
For these reasons, the Appeals Board's finding that Guenon stole or misappropriated 
property is not supported by substantial evidence. 
IV. THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUENON 
INTENTIONALLY VIEWED PORNOGRAPHY ON HIS CITY-
OWNED COMPUTER. 
The third finding of Guenon's termination upheld by the Appeals Board was that 
Guenon: 
viewed pornographic materials on [Guenon's] City-owned computer 
between the months of November 2007 and August 2008 for non-
departmental purposes in violation of Police Department General 
Order No. 17-3 and City Policy Computer Systems Internet and 
Electronic Communication Policy, pages 49 and 50. 
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R. 222. City policy forbids employees from intentionally viewing pornography on 
City-owned computers. That policy states, in relevant part: "[t]he use of city-owned 
computer resources to intentionally view, download, or send pornography, sexually 
explicit materials or materials with sexual content is prohibited.55 R. 277-278 (emphasis 
added). At the hearing, the City showed that three pornographic GIF files and a few 
vulgar cartoon images had been found on the hard drive of Guenon5s City-owned laptop. 
R.27:pg. 107-108; R. 28: pg. 111:9-25. 
Former Midvale Officer Parsons Metzkow (referred to as Metscal in the record) 
testified that Midvale officers utilized a real-time internet chat program known as Instant 
Messenger to communicate with one another. R. 79: pg. 244 (18-25)-pg. 245 (1-7). 
Officer Metzkow stated that each Instant Messenger user has the ability to send images 
and Emoticons (emotional icons) to other users. R. 80: pg. 246 (5-18). The recipient has 
no control over the images he receives, other than to close out of the program. Id. 
Officer Metzkow testified that the images found on Guenon5 s computer were Instant 
Messenger Emoticons that had been sent by third parties to Guenon. R. 83: pg. 258 (1-
24). 
Guenon testified that he never used his City computer to visit pornographic 
websites unrelated to his police work. R. 59: pg. 165 (16-22). Guenon also testified that 
at times he had received e-mails from third parties containing unwanted pornographic 
images. R. 61: pg. 171 (10-22). When Guenon received these images he would 
immediately close them. Id. Ken Davis testified that, like Guenon, he often received 
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unsolicited pornography in his personal email account and simply deleted it. R. 86: pg. 
271 (8-16). Guenon confirmed that the few pornographic images found on his computer 
had been sent to him unsolicited by third parties via Instant Messenger or e-mail. R. 62: 
pg. 174 (24-25); pg. 175-176. 
The City did not present any evidence that Guenon intentionally viewed 
pornography. Sgt. Hodgkinson, the Police Department's computer technology manager, 
testified that he could not determine whether the few pornographic images found on 
Guenon5s computer were intentionally downloaded by Guenon and conceded that they 
could have been sent by third parties via e-mail to Guenon. R. 29: pg. 115-116 (1-13). 
Sgt. Hodgkinson could not determine whether Guenon had solicited any of the images 
found on his computer. Id. While the City used a filter software program to prevent 
most pornographic images from being sent to City e-mail accounts, that software would 
not have prevented pornographic images from being sent to an officer's personal e-mail 
account. R. 31: pg. 123 (17-25)-pg. 124 (1-20). 
When Guenon was placed on administrative leave, the City sent Guenon's laptop 
to a forensic specialist to determine the extent of pornography viewed on Guenon's 
computer. R. 13: pg. 49 (14-25)-pg. 50 (1-4). The forensic examiner found that a search 
of the computer's HTML files (internet websites) and e-mails revealed no pornographic 
material. R. 174. The forensic examiner stated that when a person is actively seeking out 
and viewing pornography on a computer, vast amounts of images will show up imbedded 
on the computer's hard drive. R. 176. This is consistent with Officer Metzkow's 
testimony that when a computer visits a web site, every photograph on that site is 
21 
imprinted onto the computer's hard drive. R. 81: pg. 253 (2-15). The forensic examiner 
concluded that "[t]here were...several graphics which appeared to be pornographic in 
nature, but not enough to suggest that the user was actively searching for pornography on 
this computer." Id. (emphasis added). Sgt. Hodgkinson had no reason to disagree with 
the forensic examiner's opinion that Guenon was not actively searching for pornography. 
R. 31: pg 122 (7-20). 
In sum, the City failed to show substantial evidence that Guenon intentionally 
viewed or solicited pornography on his City-owned computer. Guenon denied it. Both 
Officer Metzkow and Guenon stated that the few images found were Instant Messenger 
emoticons that had been sent by third parties to Guenon. Guenon explained that this was 
unsolicited. Officer Metzkow testified that all of the images contained in websites visited 
by Guenon would have been embedded into the hard drive. Despite the fact that Guenon 
had used the laptop for several months, only a handful of pornographic images were 
found. The forensic examiner opined that there was no evidence Guenon was actively 
searching for pornography. Sgt. Hodgkinson had no reason to disagree with that opinion, 
and could not rule out that the few images found may have been sent, unsolicited, to 
Guenon's computer. 
Neither the City nor the Appeals Board utilized the correct standard in determining 
Guenon violated the pornography policy. That policy only proscribes intentional 
conduct. R. 277-278. However, the City never alleged that Guenon's conduct was 
intentional. R. 222. It is telling that at the hearing, Chief Mason incorrectly stated that 
any viewing of pornographic material, intentional or not, was a violation of City policy. 
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R. 15: pg. 60 (7-25)-R. 16: pg. 61 (1-4). Even the Appeals Board never found that 
Guenon's conduct was intentional. It merely concluded that Guenon had "viewed and 
maintained pornographic materials." See Addendum B. Because the City presented no 
evidence of intentional conduct, it was improper for Guenon to be terminated on this 
charge. 
V. THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN INCLUDING AS AN ELEMENT OF 
TERMINATION GUENON'S DELIVERY OF A CD CONTAINING LEWD 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF MIDVALE EMPLOYEES TO THE UTAH 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, IN LIGHT OF THE UTAH 
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ACT. 
One of the five cited reasons for the City's termination of Guenon is that Guenon 
committed insubordination by: 
Failure to follow chain of command, namely delivery of a DVD/CD 
to the attorney general's office and making complaints against 
fellow officers. 
R. 223. The City alleges that in reporting purported criminal conduct directly to the 
Attorney General, Guenon violated the following two policies: 
Members have the authority to act consistent with their statutory 
authority and within their specific assignment or as otherwise 
required by a specific situation. It is also the duty of each member to 
know who his or her supervisors are in the chain of command and 
obey all lawful orders...Each member is responsible to secure 
supervisory assistance when necessary to determine appropriate 
action, or when a situation requires resolution at a more appropriate 
level in the chain of command. 
R. 273. 
23 
Critical offenses[:]...Insubordination, disrespectful behavior towards 
a manager or supervisor or the refusal to obey a legitimate directive 
from the supervisor or designated supervisor. 
R. 275. 
Some of the photographs Guenon found on his assigned computer depicted minor 
children in the presence of a female officer wearing a sheer negligee that revealed the 
officer's breast and nipples. R. 58: pg. 160 (25)-pg. 161 (1-7). As a law enforcement 
officer of several years, Guenon was familiar with Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5, which 
states in relevant part: 
A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person... 
intentionally or knowingly does any of the following to, or in the 
presence of a child who is under 14 years of age:...exposes his or 
her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the 
buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area: in a public place; or in a 
private place: under circumstances the person should know will 
likely cause affront or alarm; or with the intent to arouse or gratify 
the sexual desire of the actor or the child... 
(emphasis added). 
After reviewing the photographs, Guenon reasonably believed that they depicted 
acts of lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor. R. 58: pg. 161 (11-18). 
Guenon contacted the Attorney General's Office. R. 59: pg. 165 (2-4). Jessica 
Farnswoth of the Attorney General's Office discussed the allegations with Guenon over 
the telephone and specifically requested that Guenon deliver the CD to her office for 
review. R. 181. Ms. Farnsworth ultimately concluded that the photographs did not rise 
to the level of child pornography. Id. However, Ms. Farnsworth did concur that the 
photographs depicted "several adult females and young female children wearing 
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negligee. In several of the pictures you can see through the negligee and see the breasts 
of one of the adult females." Id. Ultimately the Attorney General's Office, in its 
discretion, declined to file criminal charges. Id. 
Guenon's reporting was protected under the Utah Protection of Public Employees 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(l)(a) (hereafter, "the Act"). The Act provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
An employer may not take adverse action against an employee 
because the employee...communicates in good faith the existence 
of... a violation of a law, rule, or regulation adopted under the law of 
this state, a political subdivision of this state, or any recognized 
entity of the United States. 
It is undisputed that Guenon found photographs containing questionable content. That 
content appeared to meet the elements of a criminal act; therefore, Guenon was reporting 
a "violation of a law ... of this state." The Act prohibits the City from taking adverse 
action (which clearly includes termination of employment) against Guenon for making 
such a report. The fact that the Attorney General's Office declined to file criminal 
charges does not affect Guenon's protection under the Act. 
The City's contention that Guenon was insubordinate is not supported by the 
language of the two policies to which the City cites. For example, the City does not 
allege and presented no evidence that Guenon was unfamiliar with his superiors in the 
chain of command. See R. 273. Likewise, the City presented no evidence that Guenon 
ever disobeyed a direct order or acted disrespectfully to a superior officer. See R. 273, 
275. While the City policy does state that "each member is responsible to secure 
supervisory assistance when necessary," that language is vague and ambiguous in that the 
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phrase "when necessary" is never defined. R. 273. According to the language of the 
City's own policies, Guenon's reporting of suspected criminal conduct to the Attorney 
General was not an act of insubordination. 
VL THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN INCLUDING AS AN ELEMENT OF 
TERMINATION GUENON'S REPORTING OF A PUBLIC SAFETY 
HAZARD DIRECTLY TO THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND 
FIREARMS, IN LIGHT OF THE UTAH PROTECTION OF PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES ACT. 
The Appeals Board also upheld the City's fifth finding that Guenon committed an 
act of insubordination by reporting "alleged ATF violations to ATF in lieu of reporting 
the violations to City personnel." R. 223. 
In late 2007, the City purchased 50 pounds of explosives which it began storing in 
two different rooms located in the police station. R. 22: pg. 88 (10-14). The manner in 
which the explosives were being stored was a public safety hazard and violated 
regulations of the ATF, but was done so anyway because the City had insufficient funds 
in its budget to purchase an approved magazine. R. 183-186. Captain Shreeve knew that 
the City's storage of the explosives violated ATF regulations but did nothing to rectify 
the situation because he "had many pressing items" at the time. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R. 
183-184. 
Guenon first reported the ATF violation to his direct supervisor, Sgt. Marcelo 
Rapella. R. 74: pg. 222 (18-25)-pg. 223 (1-7). Guenon then reported the violation 
directly to the ATF. R. 63: pg. 180 (5-8). The ATF investigated the charge, found that 
the City was in violation of two separate ATF regulations, and ordered the City to 
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immediately move the explosives to an approved magazine. R. 185-187. In its report of 
the incident, the ATF found as follows: 
Midvale Police Department was storing 50 lbs. of explosives in two 
separate closets that did not meet proper storage magazine 
regulations.. .[The officers] were advised that the explosives material 
needed to be moved at once due to public safety. 
R. 186. 
Guenon's supervisors knew of the ATF violations but failed to act due to the cost 
of remedying the violation. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R. 183-186. Therefore, it was 
reasonable for Guenon to conclude that reporting the violations to his superiors would 
have had no effect. Regardless, Guenon's reporting was protected under the Act. 
Guenon reported a "violation of a law, rule, or regulation" to the appropriate outside 
agency. The Act prohibits the City from taking adverse action against Guenon for doing 
so. 
VII. THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
TERMINATION OF GUENON WAS THE PROPORTIONATE AND 
APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE FOR GUENON'S ALLEGED VIOLATIONS 
OF POLICIES. 
The Court must determine "whether discipline is appropriate and second whether 
the particular discipline meted out is proportionate to the offense." Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah App. 1995). "[T]he 
[Court] must make two inquiries when reviewing appeals brought by suspended or 
discharged employees: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department 
head, and, if so, (2) do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" In re Discharge of 
Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah 1986). "If the [Court] finds upon review that the facts 
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support the charges against the [employee], then it must affirm the [City]'s disciplinary 
action, unless it finds the sanction so clearly disproportionate to the charges as to amount 
to an abuse of the [City]'s discretion." Id at 1363. In light of the evidence on the record, 
termination was much too harsh of a punishment. 
First, it is undisputed that in keeping identification cards in his vehicle, Guenon 
was simply following the Department's common practice. The City had never 
disciplined another officer for violating the evidence policy, despite the fact that 
identification cards were often littered around the police station. Second, the City did not 
present any evidence to show Guenon intentionally viewed, solicited, or downloaded 
pornography. All of the evidence suggests that (1) the few images found were sent 
unsolicited to Guenon via email or Instant Messenger and (2) Guenon did not actively 
seek after pornography. Third, the City did not establish its claims of theft and 
insubordination as a matter of law. Guenon never took possession of someone else's 
property or deprived anyone of their property. The photographs that Guenon downloaded 
had been abandoned by Sgt. Egan. Fourth, Guenon's acts of reporting violations of law 
to the Attorney General and the ATF are protected under the Act. Guenon's conduct 
does not rise to the level of insubordination as that term is defined in the City's policies. 
Fifth, Guenon's exemplary record as a police officer tips the balance against 
termination. Ogden City, 116 P.3d at 978; R. 188-213. In 2004 Guenon was honored as 
Midvale's Officer of the Year. R. 214. On February 25, 2004, Guenon received a letter 
of commendation for his proactive work on patrol which had "yielded drugs, guns, 
warrant arrests, and stolen vehicles." R. 215. On September 1, 2003, Guenon received a 
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letter of commendation for discovering a burglary in progress and single-handedly 
apprehending the burglar. R. 216. Guenon always received outstanding evaluations from 
his supervisors. R. 54: pg. 143 (8-13). The City did not present any evidence 
questioning Guenon's extensive commendations. For all of the foregoing reasons, 
Guenon's termination was clearly disproportionate to his actions and an abuse of the 
City's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Guenon respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
the Appeals Board's findings upholding The City's termination of Guenon. Guenon 
further requests that he be reinstated as a Midvale City police officer with back pay from 
the date of his termination. 
FAD AT A\Rhanc\F.O.P\Jack Guenon\AppealBrieO .Midavle.doc 
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Title/Chapter/Section: | ^ ° *<>i 
Utah Code 
Title 67 State Officers and Employees 
Chapter 21 Utah Protection of Public Employees Act 
Section 3 Reporting of governmental waste or violations of law — Employer action — Exceptions. 
67-21-3. Reporting of governmental waste or violations of law -- Employer action — 
Exceptions. 
(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee, or a 
person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good faith the existence of any 
waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule, or 
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or any recognized 
entity of the United States. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to have communicated in good faith if 
he gives written notice or otherwise formally communicates the waste, violation, or reasonable suspicion 
to the state auditor. This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the employee knew or reasonably 
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false, or frivolous. 
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because an employee participates 
or gives information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other 
form of administrative review held by the public body. 
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee has objected 
to or refused to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably believes violates a law of this state, a 
political subdivision of this state, or the United States, or a rule or regulation adopted under the authority 
of the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States. 
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability 
to document the existence of any waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of any laws, rules, or regulations. 
Amended by Chapter 187, 1992 General Session 
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Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: | ' G o T o 1 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 404 Theft — Elements. 
76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
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« Previous Section (76-6-403) Next Section (76-6-404.5)» 
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Title/Chapter/Section: | 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 404.5 Wrongful appropriation ~ Penalties. 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily 
appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control by the actor is not 
presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the 
control of the property by any person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as provided in Section 76-6-
412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a third degree felony if it is 
wrongful appropriation; 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it is 
wrongful appropriation; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class B misdemeanor if it 
is wrongful appropriation; and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class C misdemeanor if it 
is wrongful appropriation. 
(4) Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft under Section 76-6-
404. 
Amended by Chapter 48, 2001 General Session 
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Titie/Chapter/Section: | Go To | 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 9 Offenses Against Public Order and Decency 
Section 702,5 Lewdness involving a child. 
76-9-702.5. Lewdness involving a child. 
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under circumstances not amounting 
to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally or knowingly does any of 
the following to, or in the presence of a child who is under 14 years of age: 
(a) performs an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks, the anus, or 
the pubic area: 
(i) in a public place; or 
(ii) in a private place: 
(A) under circumstances the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm; or 
(B) with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; 
(c) masturbates; 
(d) under circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child under Section 76-5a-3, 
causes a child under the age of 14 years to expose his or her genitals, anus, or breast, if female, to the 
actor, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; or 
(e) performs any other act of lewdness. 
(2) (a) Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor, except under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) Lewdness involving a child is a third degree felony if at the time of the violation: 
(i) the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7; or 
(ii) the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section. 
Amended by Chapter 354, 2009 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 366, 2009 General Session 
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ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE MIDVALE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD 
IN RE TERMINATION OF JACK 
GUENON, 
Appellant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
This matter was heard by the Midvale City Employee Appeals Board on 
November 20, 2008 and December 1, 2008. The City was represented by Mr. Craig 
Hall. The Appellant, Jack Guenon, was represented by Mr. Ryan Hancey. The Board, 
having heard the testimony and reviewed the documents submitted, and being fully 
advised, the Board finds that the following facts are relevant to this matter and have been 
established by a preponderance of the evidence: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Appellant was police officer with Midvale City. 
2. On or about October 31, 2008 the Appellant's employment with Midvale City was 
terminated for cause, subject to the appeal by Mr. Guenon to the City's Employee Appeal 
Board. 
3. An appeal to the Midvale City Employee Appeal Board was timely filed. 
4. The Employee Appeal Board was properly constituted and the appeal hearing was 
properly noticed and conducted to all parties. 
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5. That Police Department General Order 13-1.A provides that all evidence and property 
should be placed into evidence before the end of an officer's shift and that evidence and 
property should not be stored in an officer's car. 
5. That during his employment with the City the Appellant Guenon mishandled 
evidence and or property of others that came into his possession, namely, as many as 44 
driver's licenses, credit cards, state identification cards, immigration identification cards, 
and Mexico identification cards, by keeping and maintaining these items in his police 
vehicle in violation of Police Department General Order 13-1. A 
6. That some of the documents were kept and maintained by the Appellant Guenon for a 
substantial period of time, up to four years. 
7. That other officers in the department also violated the General Order regarding 
evidence and property by not placing some property and evidence such as ceased 
personal identifications into evidence and by leaving various items such as driver's 
licenses and other identification cards around the police department offices. 
8. That the Appellant's violation of the General Order regarding evidence and property 
was substantially more significant than what other officers may have done in both the 
number of items kept in his car and the length of time that the items were kept by the 
Appellant. 
9. That the Appellant found and otherwise possessed private personal property, namely, 
private vacation photos of another officer on DVD/CD and made copies of the photos and 
distributed these copies to other individuals without the permission of the owner of the 
photos. 
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10. That taking, coping and distributing the photos to others may be an act of theft and 
misappropriation of property of another in violation of Police Department General Order 
6.01.4 and City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61 in that possession of the DVD/CD 
which the Appellant copied from the city's computer was not the Appellant's property. 
11. That an employee does not have the right to copy files from the city's computer and 
possess them. Appellant possessed at his home the copied DVD/CD for more than 6 
months. Appellant indicated that the purpose of making a copy of the DVD/CD was 
merely to give "shit" to the persons whose likenesses were contained in the photos. 
12. That Appellant admitted that he wrote on the DVD/CD "Job Security". 
13. That six months later that Appellant expressed some concern about the content of the 
photos being a violation of law. 
14. That the Appellant viewed and maintained pornographic materials on his City owned 
computer between the months of November 2007 and August 2008 for non-departmental 
purposes in violation of Police Department General Order No. 17-3 and City Policy 
Computer Systems Internet and Electronic Communication Policy, pages 49 and 50. 
15. The pornographic material was downloaded and viewed during the period of time 
that the computer was in the possession of the Appellant, including July 27, 2008, the 
date when the material was last viewed. 
16. That the Midvale Police department operates like a paramilitary organization with a 
set chain of command which officers are expected to adhere to. 
17. That following the chain of command is important to the operation of a successful 
police department. 
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18. That following the chain of command requires that an officer who finds or suspects 
misconduct of another officer or the department is expected to report his findings and 
suspicions to his direct supervisor unless the allegations concern that supervisor and in 
that case to report up to the next higher supervisor. 
19. That the Appellant failed to follow the police department chain of command by 
delivering the DVD/CD which contained the vacation photos to the attorney general's 
office and making complaints against fellow officers in violation of Department Policy 
No. 106.5. and City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61. 
20. That the Appellant failed to follow the police department chain of command by 
reporting an alleged ATF violations to the ATF in lieu of reporting the violations to City 
personnel in violation of Department Policy No. 106.5. and City Policy Standards of 
Conduct, page 61. 
21. That delivery of the DVD/CD to third persons without first reporting the concerns 
about fellow police officers was in violation of the understood "chain of command" 
practice and policy of the department. 
22. That if the Appellant felt the DVD/CD contained evidence of criminal misconduct of 
another officer that the Appellant had the duty to report the alleged criminal misconduct 
and deliver the DVD/CD to either a captain or the chief of police of the Midvale 
department. 
23. That the reporting of the alleged ATF violation directly to the federal agency, rather 
than through police department channels, was made because of internal conflict with 
various individuals of the department. 
24. That Appellant, a trained firearms inspector, had the responsibility and opportunity to 
report the alleged violation to his superiors. 
25. That the failure to also report the potential ATF violation to his appropriate 
supervisor was inappropriate and outside the normal chain of command. 
26. That the Appellant was not disciplined because he reported suspected crimes to the 
Utah Attorney General or suspected violations to the ATF but was disciplined for his 
failure to report these suspected violation of rules and law to his supervisors and through 
the appropriate chain of command. 
BASED UPON THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT THE MIDVALE CITY 
EMPLOYEES APPEALS BOARD CONCLUDES AS FOLLOWS: 
A. The Appeals Board finds that the Appellant, Jack Guenon did violate Midvale 
City and Midvale City pohce department policies and procedures and that termination of 
his employment with the City is a proportionate and appropriate discipline for the 
violations of policies; and 
B. That all personnel rules and regulations of governing the process of disciplining a 
Midvale City and the police department employee were substantially complied with. 
RULING 
The Appeals Board, by majority vote taken on secret ballot, upholds the 
termination of Jack Guenon as an employee of the City. 
Dated and Signed for the Appeals Board this j Q day of LSPCf^^f— 
2008. 
Chairman of the Midvale CityEmployee Appeal Board 
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MIDVftLE 
In the Middle of Everything 
CITY RECORDER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Rori L. Andreason, City Recorder in and for the City of Midvale, State of Utah, 
do hereby certify that the enclosed Findings of Fact and Conclusions regarding the 
Termination of Jack Guenon is a true and correct copy of the original document 
signed by the Midvale City Employees Appeals Board Chairman. 
Dated this 11th day of December, 2008. 
fO&P^-
RorijL. Aiidreason,TYEVlC 
City Recorder/Human Resource Director 
ADDENDUM C 
RYAN B.HANCEY (9101) 
KESLER & RUST 
Mclntyre Building, 2nd Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
Fax: (801) 531-7965 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IS THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JACK GUENON, an individual; 
Petitioner, 
v. 
MIDVALE CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; and MIDVALE CITY 
EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD; 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Appeal No. 
Midvale City Employee Appeals Board 
Decision Dated December 10,2008 
Notice is hereby given that Jack Guenon, Petitioner, by and through his counsel of record 
Kesler & Rust, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to review the decision of the Respondent 
Midvale City Employee Appeals Board made in this matter on December 10,2008. 
This Petition seeks review of the entire decision made by Respondent 
Petitioner requests the court to direct the Respondent to prepare and certify to the court 
its entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter. 
DATED this <. n * day of December, 2008. 
KESLER^: RUST 
RyariJa./ir i^ice\ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
F:\DATA\Rhanc\F.O.P\Jack Guenon\PctReview.MidvaIc.doc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and 
correct copy of PETITION FOR REVIEW this %?\ day of December, 2008. 
j~~ | Federal Express Craig Hall 
. Mail One Utah Center 
• Hand Delivery 201 S. Main St., #2000 
f l Telefax/Email Transmission Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
S) { . I Attorney for Midvale City 
1 hULUxX. /^llh^^LtT 
